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SYMPOSIUM 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS: JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES, TRANSACTIONAL 
PLANNING, AND LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Juliet P. Kostritsky† 
 
The three papers in this Symposium address the topic of incom-
plete contracts.1 The recognition that parties will often fail to achieve 
completely contingent contracts2 that provide for an optimal outcome 
in any future state of the world raises the important question of what 
role courts could or should play in such contracts.  
Scholars working in the law-and-economics tradition have sug-
gested that courts should use a hypothetical bargain approach to in-
completeness, filling in terms that are optimal (efficient) and that the 
parties themselves would have achieved were it not for the transaction 
                                                                                                                 
†
 
 © 2005. John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law. Exceptional research assistance was provided by Michael F. Doty (first year law student 
at Case School of Law; J.D. expected University of Chicago 2007). Research funding was pro-
vided by the Dean’s Summer Grant Program. 
1
 Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151 (2005); Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transac-
tional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES L. REV. 169 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187 (2005). 
All three papers in this Symposium were inspired by the AALS Contracts Section in San Fran-
cisco, CA on January 8, 2005. 
2
 See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpre-
tation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 91 (2000) (“A more com-
plete contract takes account of many future contingencies that would change the value of per-
formance.”); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONO-
METRICA 755, 756 (1988); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 274 (1992) (comparing 
“the ‘relational view’ of contract adjudication to the law-and-economics view” and discussing 
“the causes of contractual incompleteness”); see also Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts 
and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992) (exploring the relationship between incomplete 
contracts and signaling).  
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costs.3 While the authors in this Symposium draw on this traditional 
economic analysis of contracts, they explore new insights from eco-
nomics and “economic contract theory”4 that complicate the analysis 
of incompleteness in contracts. Relying on economists’ theories of 
incomplete contracts, the Symposium authors identify uncertainty and 
the cost of and limited access to information as key problems affect-
ing parties both ex ante when contracts are being drafted and ex post 
when they are being enforced.5 Uncertainty is a factor that makes it 
difficult to negotiate contracts that can simultaneously protect specific 
investments and also promote efficiency ex post.6  
The Symposium authors sort out what economists and lawyers 
mean when they reference an “incomplete contract” and identify two 
key assumptions of the new economic literature. These two assump-
tions are (1) courts are imperfect and may be unable to verify certain 
facts and (2) parties can renegotiate the terms of their contracts.7 Us-
ing these insights, the three authors address the implications of the 
verifiability problem and possibility of renegotiating contractual 
terms for (1) parties designing complete and contingent efficient con-
tracts, (2) scholars designing theoretical solutions to the verifiability 
                                                                                                                 
3
 See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Inter-
pretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (1991) (discussing complex and “unresolved” issues 
involved in the method and applications of the hypothetical bargain standard); Jules L. Coleman 
et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract 
Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 644 (1989) (discussing hypothetical consent as basis of 
bargain). 
4
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 187 (“[E]conomic contract theory should incorporate 
a more textured understanding of the process for judicial enforcement of contracts.”); see also 
Craswell, supra note 1, at 151 (“While that literature has had a good deal to say about some 
decisions that contracting parties must make[,] . . . it has had little or nothing to say about other 
decisions, including decisions about precautions that might reduce the likelihood of an acciden-
tal breach.”); Katz, supra note 1, at 171 (“[I]n the language of law-and-economics, scholars 
should pay greater attention to considerations of private transactional efficiency as opposed to 
larger issues of social efficiency.”). 
5
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 191 (“In contract theory, incompleteness is due to the 
fact that information is costly and sometimes unavailable to (a) the parties at the time of con-
tracting or (b) the parties or the enforcing court at the time of enforcement.”); see also Craswell, 
supra note 1, at 155 (focusing on the problem of setting rules with the “limitations [that] (a) 
courts are imperfect decision-makers and (b) parties can always renegotiate their contracts”); 
Katz, supra note 1, at 171 (stressing that “the parties have more information than the courts”). 
6
 The authors discuss the conflict between enforcing contracts to promote the security 
needed to foster investment and the conflicting need to promote efficiency ex post. Katz, supra 
note 1, at 171-72; Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 189. Protection of the investment might call 
for enforcement even when circumstances have changed so that enforcement would no longer 
be efficient. 
7
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 152, 155 (distinguishing the “newer ‘incomplete contracts’ 
literature” from the traditional law-and-economics analysis of contracts); Katz, supra note 1 at 
173-74 (discussing the theory of “strategic renegotiation design” and the problem of “unverifi-
able information, or unverifiability”); Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 188, 192 (stating that 
“[a]n important concern of contract theory is the renegotiation of agreements”).  
 10/19/2005 2:17:08 PM 
2005] INTRODUCTION 137 
problem,8 (3) courts searching for rules that will best promote optimal 
investment beforehand and ex post efficiency once the future has re-
solved the prior uncertainty, and (4) contracts scholars attempting to 
decide what issues should be further explored.9  
Professors Scott and Triantis illuminate what they view as an un-
realistic view of verifiability.10 That view assumes that matters are 
either verifiable or not in a static way and that when matters affecting 
contract enforcement can be classified as nonverifiable, enforcement 
costs will necessarily be high.11 Scott and Triantis reject this “styl-
ized” view of verifiability as unrealistic.12 Rather than accepting un-
verifiability as an unalterable and insuperable obstacle for parties and 
courts, they argue that verifiability is a dynamic and nuanced concept. 
Scott and Triantis view the process as a dynamic one in which parties 
themselves can affect costs either by investing in litigation strategies 
in ways that reduce enforcement costs or by trading off between en-
forcement (what Scott and Triantis call “back-end costs”) and drafting 
costs (what Scott and Triantis call “front-end costs”).13  
Professor Avery Katz also identifies verifiability as a key issue in 
the literature of incomplete contracts,14 but he urges a reorientation in 
contracts scholarship.15 He urges a “different perspective” that offers 
advice not only to legal decision-makers but to parties and their law-
yers.16 Katz offers party-based “transactional strategies for managing 
contractual incompleteness”17 problems in ways that will “increase 
transactional value.”18  
                                                                                                                 
8
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 191 (classifying these scholarly solutions as part of 
the mechanism design literature).  
9
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 167 (outlining the search for contracting parties as one ave-
nue for incomplete contracting literature to pursue); Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 198-200 
(urging scholars to investigate different choices that parties might make in the process of litiga-
tion (whether to arbitrate or settle) and how the anticipation of such choices might affect earlier 
choices that parties make both in crafting their initial contracts and in acting efficiently during 
performance of the contract). 
10
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 195-96. 
11
 Id. In addition to high costs, there may be problems of judicial errors.  
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. at 196. For example, one can reduce the ex ante drafting costs by leaving certain 
matters for courts to decide later on, adding to back-end enforcement costs. Id. at 196-97. The 
overall costs may be lower under such a strategy since at the actual time of enforcement, “in-
formation may yet be superior to (less costly than) that of the parties at the time they contract.” 
Id. at 197.  
14
 Katz, supra note 1, at 174-75.  
15
 Id. at 171. 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id. at 176. Professor Katz offers several reasons for this reorientation, both “pedagogi-
cal” and “substantive.” Id. at 171. Students will be better at negotiating agreements if they are 
trained in how efficiency might affect the parties’ choice of strategies given the fact of contrac-
tual incompleteness. In addition, devising strategies for parties will avoid the problems that 
courts and public lawmakers will inevitably lack information that is more readily available to 
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Professor Craswell helps us understand what the economics of in-
complete contracts scholarship is and is not about. As Craswell ex-
plains, the issue is not about whether a particular contract is or is not 
complete in the sense that it contains a gap.19 Rather, what matters in 
designing optimally complete contracts and deciding on legal strate-
gies to deal with complete and incomplete contracts are the assump-
tions that certain matters may be unverifiable to a third party and that 
parties can renegotiate contracts.20 He uses those assumptions to offer 
new insights into legal issues that previously had been addressed by 
the older law-and-economics literature, including how to provide in-
centives for parties to invest efficiently ex ante and make efficient 
decisions about breach ex post.21 Craswell also explores a topic that 
previously had been addressed by the older literature, but which has 
not yet been addressed by the “incomplete contracts” literature: 
whether the law can encourage parties to take efficient precautions
 
that will actually avoid the necessity of breach.22  
All three authors are concerned with how to improve welfare for 
the parties23 given the dual assumptions concerning verifiability24 and 
renegotiation. Thus, efficiency and incentives remain central to the 
authors’ scholarship on incomplete contracting. However, the papers 
take different approaches to the issue of achieving optimal outcomes. 
Craswell accepts the problem of verifiability as a real problem and 
examines how to design legal rules that will best achieve particular 
types of efficiencies.25 In contrast, Katz focuses on guiding parties to 
design contracts that can overcome or mitigate incompleteness.26  
                                                                                                                 
the parties. Id. In fact, maximizing value will require access to much “local” information that “is 
much more likely to be accessible to them [the contracting parties] in the context of planning 
than to a court in the context of adjudicating a dispute . . . .” Id. at 172. 
18
 Id. at 185.  
19
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 153. 
20
 Id. at 152-53. 
21
 Id. at 157-61. 
22
 Id. at 151, 163-67. 
23
 For example, Scott and Triantis seem to share the assumption of the economic literature 
“that the private goal of contracting parties is to maximize the shared value created by a contract 
(the ‘surplus’).” Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 188.  
24
 In the case of Scott and Triantis, the concept of verifiability is one that assumes that 
parties will weigh these costs when they actually design contracts to take account of such costs. 
Id. at 197-98. Rather than automatically assuming that unverifiable matters will not be included 
in a contract ex ante because the enforcement costs will be so high, Scott and Triantis argue that 
the process of trading off costs is a more complex one than originally perceived. In a state of the 
world that remains uncertain at the time of contracting, parties can either try to reduce that un-
certainty by investigating matters up front and incurring drafting costs to take into account fu-
ture contingencies, or alternatively, they can decide to leave a matter unresolved until litigation, 
with its expected costs, forces a resolution. Even litigation costs however, are not fixed since 
they can be affected by the parties’ litigation strategies. Id. 
25
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 153-54. 
26
 Katz, supra note 1, at 177-85. 
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Scott and Triantis are also concerned with how to design optimal 
contracts, but they suggest that to arrive at an answer to that question, 
economic contract theory must account not only for the possibilities 
of performance, breach, and renegotiation, but also for litigation or 
enforcement costs.27 They stress that scholars who take account of 
enforcement costs should also conduct a “backward induction” proc-
ess.28 In particular, the process would follow a similar pattern to that 
employed in looking backward at the effects of ex post renegotiation 
on a variety of matters, including the effects on ex ante efficient in-
vestment and ex post efficient breach, to determine the effect of ex 
post litigation costs would have on contract design.29 In addition, 
Scott and Triantis explore strategies that parties use in litigation and 
contract design to demonstrate how the transactors can mitigate veri-
fiability problems themselves.30 
The idea that contracts are inevitably incomplete is not new to 
economists or lawyers.31
 
What is new is the insight that all contracts 
are incomplete and that lawyers and economists might approach the 
idea in different ways.32 Lawyers emphasize that a contract is incom-
plete when it contains a gap.33 Absent a gap, the contract would be 
considered “obligationally complete.” 34 Economists, however, use a 
different approach to determine if a contract is incomplete. They ar-
gue that even if a contract contains complete terms, “[a] contract is 
incomplete if it fails to provide for the efficient set of obligations in 
                                                                                                                 
27
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 201. 
28
 Id. at 198. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 199-200. 
31
 In a perfect world, contracts would be complete. Parties would be able to anticipate all 
future contingencies that might affect payoffs from the contract and provide for them. These 
contracts would be self-enforcing because no party would have any incentive to deviate from 
the terms. There would be no need for contract law at all and no role for courts. “A fully speci-
fied contract is also an equilibrium, that is, it is self-enforcing in the sense that no party has an 
incentive unilaterally to defect from its terms.” Coleman, supra note 3, at 640.  
32
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 152-53. 
33
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 190. Professor Craswell recognizes that the presence 
of gaps and “the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts might well be useful for 
other purposes—for example, in evaluating rules of contract interpretation—that do not con-
cern” him in understanding the economic literature since that literatures takes incompleteness as 
a given. Craswell, supra note 1, at 152.  
34
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 190-91. However, whether or not a “gap” exists in 
most contracts will depend on the rules used by courts to interpret the agreement. The example 
used by Craswell to illustrate the role of judicial interpretation in determining incompleteness is 
a contract stating that a seller will “deliver 100 widgets on July 1.” If courts interpret this con-
tract to mean that the widgets must be delivered in all states of the world, there is no gap. 
Craswell, supra note 1, at 154-55. Should the court interpret the contract as not specifying a 
result in the event of an extraordinary circumstance (the example used by Craswell is the closure 
of the Suez Canal), then the contract is said to contain a “gap.” Id. 
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each possible state of the world.”35 A contract does not need to pro-
vide an outcome for every state that might materialize. If an optimal 
contract would differentiate for a particular contingency, then a con-
tract that fails to do so would be incomplete. A judgment has to be 
made as to whether a contract that looks incomplete is in fact incom-
plete when measured against an optimal contract.36  
Traditional approaches to incomplete contracts focused on finding 
out if and why a contract was incomplete or contained gaps.37 Some 
scholars emphasized that incompleteness was often a result of the 
transaction costs of negotiating for complete contracts given the con-
straints on the parties’ ability to anticipate future states or informa-
tion.38 Others argued that incompleteness stemmed from strategic 
withholding of information and suggested tailored legal strategies tied 
to the cause of incompleteness.39 The transaction cost theorists sug-
gested that gaps should be filled to achieve the results that parties 
would have achieved absent transaction costs using either a hypo-
thetical bargain approach40 or one that would maximize joint gains for 
the parties absent such costs.41 Theorists emphasizing strategic with-
holding suggested a penalty default rule approach to gap-filling in an 
attempt to force the disclosure of information ex ante.42  
The newer economic literature redefines completeness in terms of 
whether a contract can provide an efficient outcome in all states of the 
world calling for a distinct outcome.43 Under this economic defini-
tion, it is expected that virtually every contract will be incomplete.44 
Because this incompleteness is accepted as an integral part of con-
tracting, the newer literature focuses on developing a set of rules that 
will provide optimal incentives for both parties either to perform or 
breach a contract and to rely efficiently.45  
                                                                                                                 
35
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 190. 
36
 Id. at 190-91.  
37
 Identification of the cause of the incompleteness was the first step in formulating judi-
cial responses. Katz, supra note 1, at 172. 
38
 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45-46 
(1985) (discussing role of bounded rationality in contributing to incompleteness in contracts).  
39
 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989). 
40
 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporation and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 298 (1986) (discussing how a hypothetical bargain approach should be used 
to determine what corporate law should govern close corporations).  
41
 Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 597, 602-06 (1990) (discussing the positive effects of utilizing a strategy that 
maximizes joint gains for the parties).  
42
 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 39, at 94. 
43
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 190-91. 
44
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 153-55. 
45
 Id. at 153-54. 
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The newer literature attempts to develop these rules while recog-
nizing that certain factors make designing such rules very difficult.46 
One is the assumption that courts have limited competence and may 
be “unable to evaluate key factual claims.”47 The verifiability concept 
explains why economic theorists think that parties will agree to in-
complete contracts even if the parties have complete information.48 It 
has also provided a rationale for these theorists to advocate limits on 
judicial relief under such circumstances.49  
Scott and Triantis demonstrate that verifiability has a more com-
plex meaning distinct from an all or nothing “binary” concept50 and is 
a component that affects litigation costs. These authors convey the 
idea that parties can interactively invest in litigation strategies in ways 
affecting the cost of litigation.51 Therefore, it may be premature to 
assume that when matters are “nonverifiable,” they will always be so, 
and that the litigation costs associated with such unverifiable matters 
will necessarily “outweigh[] the incentive benefits to the parties”52 
from having such terms.53  
The second assumption of the economic literature on incomplete 
contracts is the recognition that parties can renegotiate contracts ex 
post. The Symposium authors use insights and assumptions from eco-
nomics to explore different facets of the design and enforcement of 
complete and incomplete contracts.  
Using insights from the economic literature, Professor Craswell 
explores how the law can provide efficient incentives to the parties54 
in the different stages of a contract. He explains just how easy it 
would be to advise legal decision-makers on how to “design a legal 
regime that optimized every incentive”55 if courts could perfectly as-
certain when actions were efficient. The recognition that courts are 
imperfect and may be unable to discern or verify certain matters (in-
                                                                                                                 
46
 Id. at 155-58; see also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis 
of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (tying judicial 
restraint in supplying terms in incomplete, relational contracts to perceived limits on courts’ 
abilities); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (arguing for new, but fewer, state-supplied default rules when asym-
metric information causes incompleteness). 
47
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 152.  
48
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 195. 
49
 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 46, at 606-08. 
50
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 196.  
51
 Id. at 198-99. 
52
 Id. at 195. 
53
 Id. One such assumption is that parties will design contracts to avoid drafting terms that 
require courts to deal with matters that are unverifiable. Id. 
54
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 157. 
55
 Id. at 156. 
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cluding the efficiency of behaviors56) helps to rationalize traditional 
rules on efficient breach. This recognition also explains the tendency 
of courts to adopt legal tests that do not rely on a court’s direct as-
sessment of the efficiency of certain actions (such as the efficiency of 
a breach), but that will still provide correct incentives to the parties 
without putting too many measurement burdens on a court.57  
Craswell then explores the implications of the second assumption 
of this newer economic literature—the possibility that contracts can 
be renegotiated—to explore how that factor might complicate the ef-
fort to design legal rules encouraging various efficiencies, including 
efficient breach and efficient reliance.58 He concludes that the legal 
rule may not matter all that much once renegotiation as a possibility is 
recognized when it comes to encouraging efficient breach.59 How-
ever, Craswell explains why designing optimal incentives to rely may 
be difficult when the renegotiation possibility exists.60  
Craswell’s paper highlights the implications of renegotiation to in-
vestigate an incentive that has not been thoroughly explored: the in-
centive of a party with a performance obligation to take efficient pre-
                                                                                                                 
56
 A classic example focuses on the efficiency of reliance investments made by a party.  
57
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 156-57. Thus, the courts adopt a damage measure that forces 
a breaching party to internalize the costs of its breach. As Craswell notes, this damage rule is 
efficient in the same way that strict liability rules in torts can be efficient: parties can estimate 
for themselves when it is efficient to breach. Because the breacher will take into account the 
damage that a court would assess and compare that amount to the benefits from breaching, the 
party can be trusted to make efficient decisions without requiring the courts to verify whether 
these decisions are efficient using a cost/benefit analysis. Id. at 157. 
58
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 158-60. 
59
 Id. at 159-60. Craswell assumes that an efficient outcome will be attainable. For exam-
ple, if the damage rule imposes a steep penalty for breaching and a party finds itself in a position 
where it is no longer efficient to perform, the party can simply renegotiate and “buy” its way out 
of the contract for an amount greater than that party’s cost of performance but less than the 
value the other party expected to receive from the contract. Id. at 159. 
60
 Id. at 161-62. If parties are able to renegotiate, a buyer has little incentive to rely effi-
ciently on the seller’s performance. No matter the amount of resources the buyer expends in 
reliance on the contract, if renegotiation is possible, the buyer can shift part of the burden of this 
reliance to the seller by demanding a higher “buyout price” in the event of the seller’s breach, 
while at the same time capturing all of the benefits of reliance in the event the seller performs. 
Thus, some of the risk is shifted to the seller, and all of the benefits redound to the buyer, leav-
ing the buyer with little incentive to restrain itself. Absent the ability to renegotiate the contract, 
the buyer would have an incentive to rely efficiently. Id. at 162-63. If the damage measure re-
mained insensitive to increases in the buyer’s reliance, the buyer would be bearing both the 
costs and benefits from any “additional reliance expenditures,” leading to optimal decisions. Id. 
at 161.  
Of course, this problem of over reliance would only be true under some measures of dam-
ages. If, as Craswell assumes, “the remedy for breach is such that the seller has to renegotiate 
and pay so that he will not have to perform, the buyer will be led to rely too much.” STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 365 (2004). Of course, if the remedy 
for breach were zero, the buyer would rely too little. “[W]hen the buyer has to renegotiate and 
bargain for performance, some of the value of reliance to him is extracted in the process, and 
anticipating this, he will tend to rely too little.” Id. In that situation, the possibility that contracts 
can be renegotiated would have the opposite effect of inducing too little reliance. 
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cautions that “reduce[] the probability of an event that would make it 
harder to perform under a contract” from occurring.61 This incentive 
has been neglected because scholars have focused on events that 
made breaching more likely to occur, but were beyond the parties’ 
control. As a result, the older economic models focused on the deci-
sions parties would make after such an event occurred, ignoring the 
idea of efficient precautions. 
Craswell recognizes there are events that promisors control that 
may be able to reduce the likelihood of a breach.62 However, the pos-
sibility of renegotiation may dilute a seller’s incentive to take effi-
cient precautions, especially when the precautionary steps are of a 
particular type involving “cooperative” investments whose benefit 
redounds largely to the noninvesting party.63 Although not offering a 
solution, Craswell uses the insights from the economics of incomplete 
contracting to open up a window onto the hitherto neglected problem 
of how to design legal rules that will optimize the precautions parties 
take.64 
Scott and Triantis also recognize that the perceived problems of 
verifiability “have driven a large body of the theorists’ models.”65 
These authors document the accepted theory that parties will be con-
strained in how they can contract because they will not want their 
contracts to be conditioned on states that are not verifiable to third 
parties.66 That theory also postulates that those constraints on con-
tracting will have negative efficiency effects both ex post and ex 
ante.67 Verifiability concerns have also led contract theorists to sug-
gest that courts should take a limited role in intervening in incomplete 
contracts and to argue that literalist interpretation is the preferred 
strategy for courts.68  
Without directly challenging the implications that non-
verifiability, in unmitigated form, would pose for both contracting 
and efficient incentives for parties, Scott and Triantis set out to chal-
                                                                                                                 
61
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 163. This decision on what precautions to take to avoid hav-
ing to breach is also explored in another article by the same author. Richard Craswell, Contract 
Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
62
 Craswell, supra note 1, at 163 (discussing precaution taking in the context of Jacob & 
Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921)). 
63
 Id. at 166-67 (discussing an example in which investments that the seller could make to 
improve quality actually benefit the buyer, not the seller, and exploring distinction between 
cooperative and self-investments).  
64
 Id. He also explores possible structural solutions to the efficient reliance problem that 
take account of renegotiation. Id. at 160-62.  
65
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 1, at 191.  
66
 Id.  
67
 Id. at 189-90.  
68
 E.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 46. 
 10/19/2005 2:17:08 PM 
144 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1 
lenge the conventional wisdom on verifiability in a number of ways 
and argue for “a more textured understanding of the process for judi-
cial enforcement of contracts.”69 Initially, they create this understand-
ing by assessing the “strengths and weaknesses” of recent economic 
contract theory and then illuminating these insights for legal schol-
ars.70 They introduce a new element of the adversarial process as a 
topic worthy of further research. Contracting parties must account for 
it when they design their contracts and when they assess strategic 
choices in litigation.  
Next, Scott and Triantis identify the key problem for contract: 
when contracts are negotiated under conditions of uncertainty, condi-
tions may change that later make it unprofitable for a party to go for-
ward with its contract obligations.71 There are two conflicting goals 
that contract law would like to achieve. First, it would like to provide 
enough security through enforcement to encourage parties to invest ex 
ante in efficient ways. Second, contract law also wishes to promote ex 
post efficiency by allowing parties to abandon unprofitable ex-
changes. If you afford parties the discretion to abandon exchanges, 
the parties may fail to invest ex ante in these contracts.72  
Scott and Triantis posit that the traditional solution, which could 
achieve both types of efficiencies, was for the parties to negotiate a 
completely contingent contract.73 They then posit that both transac-
tion costs and verifiability problems will prevent these contracts from 
being negotiated. They argue that the possible solutions to the verifi-
ability problems suggested by mechanism design theorists74 are not 
likely to provide a solution because the solutions themselves are “un-
realistic”75 and the solutions are not general enough to deal with a 
wide range of “information problems.”76 
Scott and Triantis identify the contribution of recent economic 
contract theory in arguing that scholars had to look beyond the deci-
sions as to performance and breach77 and examine renegotiation. Re-
negotiation could affect whether parties would invest efficiently ex 
ante since parties subject to having part of their specific investments 
shared with the other party would be reluctant to invest ex ante. At 
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the same time, renegotiation posed a problem for the solutions to the 
verifiability problem that had been suggested by mechanism design 
theorists.78  
Scott and Triantis trace how economic theory has analyzed renego-
tiation and its likely effect both on incentives and contract design. 
They suggest that a similar framework of “backward induction” 
should be applied to litigation, another arena in which parties are 
likely to act in a strategic manner.79 Applying their framework, Scott 
and Triantis assess how the litigation strategy game will affect the 
parties’ design of optimal contracts.80 
Prior to Scott and Triantis, contract theorists had thought parties 
were limited to two fairly negative choices (a Hobbesian dilemma): 
either they could leave gaps in their contract (leading to inefficien-
cies) or they could complete their contracts, but with terms a court 
could not verify (subjecting them to another risk of court error). Nei-
ther option was palatable, nor were the devices proposed by mecha-
nism design theorists a good way around the problem of unverifiable 
information.  
These authors argue that this picture of verifiability is distorted for 
several reasons, weakening contract theory in two distinct ways. The 
distorted view is that matters are really either verifiable or nonverifi-
able. We know that in cases where the information is nonverifiable, it 
will not make sense to include such terms. Consequently, scholars 
have argued that there is a whole “category of contract terms [that] 
assum[es] a priori” that the beneficial effects such terms might have 
on incentives will not be worth the costs.81 
Scott and Triantis challenge this view by pointing to the reality of 
parties’ actual contractual practices. If conventional theory were cor-
rect, then parties would not include nonverifiable terms, but as Scott 
and Triantis note, the parties do so anyway.82 The authors explain that 
the strange “gap between theory and practice”83 derives from the fail-
ure of economic contract theory to recognize either that front-end and 
back-end costs should both be considered in assessing the cost of en-
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 Id. at 193. Parties who negotiated an option contract as a means of getting the parties to 
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forcement or that litigation costs can be affected by what the parties 
themselves do in crafting litigation strategies.84 
These defects in theory lead the economic contract authors astray. 
The failure to recognize that parties may decide to contract for terms 
that are unverifiable and save front-end transacting costs (even if they 
cause back-end enforcement costs), shows that scholars may have 
myopically focused on the back-end costs. In doing so, these scholars 
have neglected the principle that front- and back-end costs must both 
be weighed in deciding whether aggregate costs (including the possi-
ble reduction in transaction costs from postponing decisions that may 
depend on unverifiable information85) justify the beneficial effects on 
incentives.86 
Beyond presenting a more nuanced picture of verifiability and a 
cost/benefit framework that includes both transaction and enforce-
ment costs, Scott and Triantis significantly contribute to the literature 
by suggesting that parties themselves control litigation costs through 
their litigation strategies in dealing with the verifiability problem.87 If 
courts make errors because they cannot verify events, then parties’ 
incentives for efficiency may be affected because of the uncertainty 
that the court will reach the correct result.88 However, Scott and Tri-
antis seek to demonstrate that verifiability concerns with litigation 
may be mitigated. Even if one accepts that verifiability might pose a 
problem if all disputes reached a court, parties themselves can take 
actions that lower those costs. They can settle cases and minimize or 
eliminate verification costs.89  
Similarly, renegotiation of contracts would avoid the need for veri-
fication. Once the parties had the relevant information, they could 
simply reach new terms and a court would not be involved. Scott and 
Triantis link the ways in which other litigation strategies, including 
“the interacting strategies of the parties to initiate, defend, and present 
evidence at trial,” can contribute to lower litigation costs.90  
Finally, Scott and Triantis also help persuade the reader that en-
forcement costs associated with nonverifiable factors may be more 
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“relative,” and thus present less of a risk once one recognizes that 
litigation is not about a “finding of an objective truth” with absolute 
“certainty.”91 While courts will make some mistakes, the mistakes 
will be subject to some “risk of error”92 even though this “risk” is not 
100 percent merely because one calls a matter “nonverifiable.” This 
more subtle calculation of risk and associated costs may affect how 
parties design contracts. By adding litigation strategy to the mix of a 
promisor’s options, Scott and Triantis let us see that the risks of non-
verifiability are not as absolute as was once thought and that parties 
have many options for overcoming verifiability. 
The third Symposium author, Avery Katz, shares the view of the 
other authors that “maximizing contractual value” and “transactional 
efficiency” should be the central concern in determining how courts 
and parties should deal with the incompleteness problem in con-
tracts.93 Like Craswell and Scott and Triantis, Professor Katz stresses 
that the problem of determining what to do about incompleteness in 
contracts is a complex problem.94 Determining whether a judicial re-
sponse is warranted first requires an understanding of reasons why the 
contract remains incomplete.  
Professor Katz explores both of the problems causing incomplete-
ness in the “ex ante negotiation” of contracts: bounded rationality and 
strategic nondisclosure.95 He also highlights “additional and novel 
explanations”96 that explain why parties leave contracts incomplete. 
These explanations emphasize that incompleteness may occur be-
cause parties anticipate that the initial contract can be supplemented 
in subsequent rounds of negotiation. Alternatively, parties may leave 
a contract incomplete because informational asymmetries between 
courts and parties will hinder competent judicial decisions interpret-
ing contractual meaning “at a reasonable cost.”97 The ex post en-
forcement costs of the verifiability problem make it futile to invest 
efforts in achieving a complete contract since the courts will not be 
able to ascertain what the parties agreed to.98  
Katz argues that all of these explanations for incompleteness mean 
that the decisions on legal intervention must first confront these 
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causes affecting both how parties negotiate contracts ex ante and how 
or if courts should respond.99 The complexities in why contracts re-
main incomplete mean that it is not possible to identify one legal in-
tervention that will enhance efficiency in “all contractual settings.”100 
In some instances, courts should be hesitant about intervening with 
terms if the parties have deliberately failed to cover a contingency 
deemed of low probability or left a gap in anticipation of the fact that 
later bargaining could resolve the matter.101 In other instances, legal 
intervention may be beneficial in curbing opportunistic behavior by 
agents.102 “[T]he nature of the substantive issue,” is a second factor 
that should determine whether collective legal intervention is war-
ranted or not.103  
After addressing the complexity of normative decisions about legal 
responses to incompleteness in contracts, Katz urges the legal acad-
emy to reorient its inquiry away from a comparative institutional as-
sessment limited to hypothetical decision-makers, such as courts and 
legislatures.104 Katz stresses that increased intellectual effort should 
be devoted to the parties themselves who must make difficult deci-
sions about what kind of interpretative regime should apply to their 
transaction.105  
Katz suggests several private strategies that the parties themselves 
can use when they negotiate and draft contracts to “manage” the in-
completeness problem in contracts.106 Some involve investing addi-
tional resources to make the ex post contractual gap filling less 
costly.107 Others involve delegating authority to one party who can 
make decisions after the contracting date when uncertainties that led 
to the initial incompleteness have been resolved by the passage of 
time.108  
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Other devices are entered into ex ante but actually operate to dis-
courage ex post filling in of contracts by nonparty actors (parol evi-
dence, liquidated damages clauses, etc.).109 These devices are a signal 
to the courts of the parties’ preference for literalist and formalistic 
interpretation rather than a contextualized approach to contract inter-
pretation and gap filling.110 The assumption is that such devices will 
lower the costs associated with filling gaps since formalistic regimes 
will arguably be less costly.111 The final strategy for dealing with in-
completeness is premised on institutional arrangements that promote 
cooperation between the parties and allow them to complete the con-
tracts ex post, obviating the need for judicial intervention.112 
Katz concludes by arguing that the relative usefulness of private 
strategies for dealing with contractual incompleteness depends on a 
myriad of local factors that can be more easily accessed by private 
decision-makers than public tribunals.113 Ultimately, Katz argues that 
the private decision-makers should be the primary focus of legal 
scholarship in contracts. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
All four authors in the three Symposium papers have chosen to ex-
plore the challenges that incomplete contracts pose for courts, schol-
ars, and contracting parties. They have educated the reader about just 
what we mean when we say that a contract is “incomplete.” They 
have situated incomplete contracts within the economics literature 
and alerted us to just how complicated it is to design contracts and 
provide efficient incentives after accounting for the verifiability prob-
lem and renegotiation possibility. They have undermined the idea that 
verifiability is an unalterable and fixed problem and shown how par-
ties themselves may mitigate verifiability problems by designing and 
managing litigation in certain ways. They have also reinvigorated the 
economic analysis of contract law by using the assumptions of the 
newer economic literature to revisit how contract rules can be de-
signed to provide efficient incentives for parties both ex ante and ex 
post.  
                                                                                                                 
potential for opportunism. Id. at 182.  
109
 Id. at 178-79.  
110
 See id. The same preference can be achieved by designating particular forums for the 
dispute. 
111
 See id. (describing methods to reduce the scope of the court’s inquiry by supplying 
formal standards of interpretation). 
112
 See id. at 183-85 (describing institutional arrangements that impede or facilitate exit 
from a relationship).  
113
 Id. at 184-85. 
